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If all individuals  were identical  in regard  to their saving behavior,  then aggregate  saving  would be
trivially  related  to individual  saving -- it would  just equal  the saving  of a representative  agent  multiplied  by the
population.  Naturally,  such a simplistic  view of aggregate  saving  would be highly  misleading.  It is hard to
understand  aggregate  consunption  and saving  patterns  without  considering  that they  reflect  dissimilar  behavior
by heterogeneous  individuals  who differ  in preferences,  resources,  and/or institutional  constraints.  Indeed,
consumption  and saving are among  the few areas  in macroeconomics  where theoretical  developments  have
occasionally  left the safe -- but severely  restrictive -- haven of representative-agent models' to venture into the
wilderness  of agent  heterogeneity,  collecting  along  the  way valuable  analytical  and  empirical  insights  -- such  as
those  derived,  for example,  from  the life-cycle  consumption  model.
One  particular  dimension  of heterogeneity  that  has  received  increased  attention  from  the  macroeconomic
viewpoint  in recent  years  is that  of income  distribution.  Recent  analytical  and empirical  work  has focused  on the
relationship  between  income  inequality,  growth  and investment. 2 Less attention  has been  paid,  however,  to the
links  between  income  distribution  and saving.
These  links are the focus  of this paper.  More  specifically,  its objective  is to ascertain  the impact  on
aggregate  saving  of changes  in the  distnbution  of income  among  groups  of savers,  after  taking  into  consideration
the  effects  of other  standard  variables  such  as aggregate  income  and its growth  rate. The  paper  concentrates  on
the  channels  through  which  distribution  affects  saving.  Yet feedback  effects  from  saving  to distribution  cannot
be ruled  out a priori, and indeed  they  are  central  to some  of the saving  hypotheses  (notably  those  emphasizing
the  functional  distribution  of income)  that  will  be reviewed  below.  Of  course,  the  possibility  of two-way  causation
is not exclusive  to income  distribution;  it applies  as well  to other standard  determinants  of saving  (income,
interest  rates,  etc.)  for which  there  is a strong  presumption  that causality  may  run in both directions.  While  our
discussion  touches  upon  these  issues,  we  do not explore  them  at length  in this paper.
The  main  conclusion  of the  paper - supported  by empirical  evidence  based  on new  income  distribution
data  constructed  by Deininger  and  Squire  (1995)  -- is  that  cross-country  data do not reveal  any strong  association
between  income  distribution  and  saving  ratios.  After  controlling  for other  saving  determinants,  aggregate  saving
ratios  do  not appear  to be significantly  related  to standard  income  distribution  indicators.  This  conclusion  holds
for  a large  cross-country  sample,  as well  as for its industrial  and developing-country  subsamples,  and is robust
to alternative  saving  measures,  income  distribution  indicators,  and functional  forms.
I See  Kirman  (1992)  for  a recent  sharp  criticism  of  the  representative-agent  paradigm.
2 See  for  example  Galor  and  Zeira  (1993), Alesina  and Rodrik  (1994),  Persson  and  Tabellini  (1994),  Perotti
(1995),  and  Alesina  and  Perotti  (1996).2
The  paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  2 presents  the stylized  facts  on saving,  income,  growth  and
distribution  using data for a large number  of industrial  and developing  countries,  and relates the empirical
regularities  present  in our sample  to those reported  in the literature.  Section  3 provides  a brief survey  of
alternative  views of saving determination,  with emphasis  on the saving consequences  of different  income
distribution  profiles.  Section  4 reviews  previous  empirical  studies  of the impact  of income  distribution  on saving,
and Section  5 presents  new  cross-coutry  econometric  evidence  using  our data set. Finally,  Section  6 concludes.
II.  Saving  and Distribution: the Stylized  Facts
We  begin  by  reviewing  the  empirical  regularities  on saving,  income  and distribution.  To do this, we  use
annual macroeconomic  data on 52 industrial  and developing  countries  from the World  Bank databases,  and
income  distribution  data  from  a new  database  recently  constructed  by Deininger  and Squire  (1995).  In principle
the  data  cover  the  years 1965  to 1994  -- although  for some  countries  some  of the  variables  of interest  (notably
income  distribution  data)  are  not available  every  year  within  this time span. The  discussion  focuses  on  the cross-
country  dimension  of the  data,  making  use of the averages  of the relevant  variables  over the  three-decade  period
above.'  Unless  otherwise  noted,  here  and  in the  rest of  the  paper  we use the term 'saving' ('saving  ratio') to refer
to gross  national  saving  (respectively,  its ratio  to GNP).  We  choose  national  saving  and national  product  data as
the  relevant  variables  because  they  are  closer  to the relevant  units (households  or individuals)  for  which  income
distribution  data  is available  than  the domestic  saving  and  domestic  product  measures.  In this respect  we differ
from  most  empirical  studies,  that are based  on the less adequate  domestic  measures.
A  preliminary  issue  that  merits  comment  is that  of measurement  error.  As is well  known,  this is a central
problem  in empirical  studies  of saving,  due not only  to the inadequacy  of the very saving  concept  used  by the
National  Accounts  (which,  for example,  exclude  capital  gains from  the definition  of income,  and treat human
capital  expenditures  as  consumption)  but also to the unreliability  of measured  saving,  which  stems largely  from
the fact  that saving  is often  computed  as the residual  from  another  residual  (consumption).  The  upshot  is that
saving measures  may contain  large errors,  particularly  in poorer countries  (see Schmidt-Hebbel,  Serv6n  and
Solimano  1996  for  further  discussion).  Measurement  error  is even  a more  serious  problem  in the case  of income
3The sample  countries  were  selected  on  the  basis  of  availability  of  income  distribution  data  (kindly  made
available  to us  by  Klaus  Deininger  and  Lyn  Squire)  and  the  following  criteria.  The  1965-94  average  for  each  country  is
computed  over  those  years  for  which  the  information  is available.  To  ensure  the  long-term  nature  of  the  averages,  the
sample  includes  only  those  countries  with  at least  one  income  distribution  observation  in each  of  two  of  the  three
decades  that  span  the  1965-94  period.  This  leaves  us  with  20  industrial  and  32 developing  countries,  out  of  the  20
industrial  and  66 non-transition  developing  countries  in the  data  base  of  Deininger  and  Squire.  More  details  are  given  in
the  data  appendix  in  this  paper.3
distribution  statistics.  The  latter  are  primarily  derived  from  household  survey  data,  which  typically  understate  the
income  of  the  richer  households.  As a result,  income  inequality  is likely  to be underestimated.  Although  no firm
evidence  is available,  most observers  would  probably  agree  that such  underestimation  again  is probably  more
severe  in poorer  coutries, because  the statistical  apparatus  involved  in the collection  of household  data is likely
to be weaker.
Keeping  in mind  these  limitations  of the  available  data,  we  turn to the review  of the stylized  facts. Since
our income  distribution  information  is new,  we first provide  some  summary  statistics  (a detailed  description  is
given  in Deininger  and Squire 1995).  Table 1 presents  means  and standard  deviations  of three  conventional
indicators  of inequality:  the Gini coefficient,  the  ratio  between  the income  shares  of the  richest  20 percent  and
poorest  40  percent  of the  population,  and  the  income  share  of the 'middle  class', defined  as the middle  60 percent
of the  population  (which  is often  used as an indicator  of equality).  The  statistics  are  computed  for three  country
groups:  industrial  countries,  developing  cntries,  and,  as a subset  of the  latter,  the so-called  'take-off' countries.
The  latter  group  is defined  as consisting  of those  developing  countries  that during  the sample  period  successfully
shifted  from  a low  to a high saving  and growth  path. 4
As Table  1 shows,  developing  countries  are more  unequal  than  industrial  countries  by any of the three
indicators  presented.  Take-off  countries,  however,  possess  on  average  an income  distribution  more  equitable  than
the rest of developing  countries,  also by all  three indicators  considered.
The  stylizedfads
The first stylized  fact concerns  the  relationship  between  saving  ratios  and level  of development  -- as
measured  by real per capita  GNP. Figure I presents  the scatter  plot of the 1965-1994  averages  of these  two
variables  for  the  sample  countries;  using  per capita  income  at the initial  year  of the sample  instead  of its average
value yields a very similar  picture.  In the figure,  countries  appear  clustered  in rough  correspondence  to their
development  level.  On  average,  saving  rates  are  lower  for developing  countries  than  for industrial  countries.  The
exception  are the take-off  economies  in our sample,  whose  saving  ratios exceed  even  the industrial-country
average.
The  figure  shows  that  saving  rates  tend  to rise  with  per capita  income:  the  correlation  coefficient  between
the  two variables  is .31, significantly  different  from  zero  at the 5 percent  level,  and  is even  higher  (.60)  among
developing  countries.  (See  the  matrix  of correlations  between  the saving  rate and related  variables  in Table  2).
4  The  group  includes  China,  seven  market-economy  East-Asian  countries  (Hong-Kong,  Indonesia,  Korea,
Malaysia,  Singapore,  Thailand  and  Taiwan  (China)),  Chile,  and Mauritius.4
A similar  association  has been  found  in a number  of empirical  studies  of saving (e.g.,  Collins  1991;  Schmidt-
Hebbel,  Webb  and Corsetti  1992;  Carroll  and Weil 1994; Masson,  Bayoumi  and Samiel  1995;  Edwards  1995).
The  figure  also  suggests  that at high levels  of per capita  income  saving  ratios  appear  to level  off -- i.e.,
the  relationship  is not linear,  and  possibly  not even  monotonic.  As a more  formal  check  on this, the solid line  in
Figure  I plots  the fitted values  from  regressing  the saving  rate on a quadratic  polynomial  in per capita income;
the estimated  coefficients  are significant  at conventional  levels. The fitted curve shows that the positive
association  between  saving  and development  appears  indeed  to be confined  to the  early  stages  of development,
ceases  to hold at about  $8,000  per capita  GNP  ( in 1987  US$), and  turns into  a negative  association  at higher
income  levels.
A second  stylized  fact  is the  strong  positive  association  between  saving  ratios  and real  per capita  growth,
which has been amply  documented  in cross-country  empirical  studies. 5 However,  its structural  interpretation
remains controversial,  as it has been  viewed  both as proof that growth  drives saving  (e.g., Modigliani  1970,
among  many  other  studies)  and that saving  drives  growth  through  the  saving-investment  link  (e.g., Levine  and
Renelt  1992;  Mankiw,  Romer  and Weil 1992).6
As Figure  2 shows,  our  data  conform  to these  findings.  Aggregate  saving  ratios  and  real per capita  GNP
growth  are  positively  associated,  and their  correlation  coefficient  equals  .63, significantly  different  from  zero at
the  5 percent  level.  However,  the  figure  also suggests  that this relationship  might  be driven  by the fast-growing,
high-saving  take-off  economies,  most  of which  are  clustered  at the  upper-right  corner  of the graph.  In fact, if these
countries  are  removed  from  the sample,  the correlation  drops  to .40,  but still  remains  significant.
Is  the  association  between  saving  and  income  distribution  as  clear-cut  as that between  saving  and income
(or  its growth  rate)  ? Figure  3, which  plots  saving  ratios  against  Gini  coefficients  of income  distribution,  shows
a less clear-cut  pattem  than  the preceding  two figures.  Nevertheless,  the full-sample  correlation  between  both
variables  is -.28, just statistically  significant  at the 5 percent  level.  The  correlation  pattern is, however,  rather
different  in the  industrial  (.10)  and developing-country  (-.26)  subsamples;  in neither  is it significantly  different
from  zer. Interestingly,  the  figure  also  reveals  a sharp distinction  between  both sets of countries  from the point
of  view  of inequality:  virtually  all  non-take-off  developing  countries  possess  a more  unequal  income  distribution
(as measured  by the Gini  coefficient)  than  that of the most unequal  OECD  country.
The above facts lead to the much-discussed  relationship  between  income inequality  and level of
5 See  for  example  Modigliani  (1970),  Maddison  (1992),  Bosworth  (1993)  and  Carroll  and  Weil  (1  994).
6 On  the  saving-growth  causality  see  the  recent  overviews  by  Carroll  and  Weil  (1994),  Deaton  (1995),  and
Scbmidt-Hebbel,  Serven  and  Solirnano  (1996).5
development  - with  the  latter  measured  as before  by real  per capita  GNP.  According  to the well-known  finding
by Kuznets  (1955),  the  relationship  between  these  variables  follows  an inverted-U  shape:  inequality  rises in the
early  stages  of development,  and  then  decreases  as per  capita  income  continues  to rise.  This stylized  fact has been
replicated  to varying  extents  in a number  of cross-country  studies  (for recent  examples  see Bourguignon  and
Morrison  1990,  and  Clarke  1991),  but its interpretation  is far from  clear (see .Adelman  and  Robinson  1989,  for
a discussion).'
Figure  4 shows  that our sample  fits the Kuznets  curve.  Keeping  with convention,  the figure  plots Gini
coefficients  against  the  log  of per capita  income  (with  both  variables  measured  by their 1965-92  averages).  The
curved  line in the graph  depicts  the fitted  values  from  regressing  the Gini coefficient  on the log of per capita
income  and  its square;  the  estimated  coefficients  are  highly  significant.  As can  be seen  from  the figure,  developing
countries  account  for the upward-sloping  portion  of the empirical  curve,  and industrial  countries  cluster  along
the  declining  portion.
One  methodological  issue  that  arises  is whether  the above  findings  are sensitive  to our choice  of the Gini
coefficient  as the relevant  statistic.  A number  of altemative  indicators  are found  in the literature  -- e.g., Theil's
index,  the  coefficient  of variation  of income  across  households,  the income  share  of the poorest  20 or 40 percent
of  the  population,  the ratio  of the latter  to the income  share  of the richest  20 percent,  or the  income  share  of the
middle  class. 8 Among  all them,  the Gini coefficient,  Theil's index  or the coefficient  of variation  are generally
preferable  because  they  use more  information  than  the commonly-encountered  quintile-based  indicators.  At the
same time, the Gini index has the well-known  drawback  that it is not uniquely  related  to the shape of the
underlying  distribution,  so that very  different  redistribution  schemes  can be reflected  in the  same  change  in the
Gini  coefficient.  Finally,  income  shares  (in levels)  and Gini  coefficients  may  pose  cross-country  comparability
problems,  likely  to be minimized  by the  use of share  ratios  (Deininger  and Squire,  1995).
In  practice,  however,  the informational  content  of all these  indicators  is usually  very  similar,  as shown
by the fact  that they  typically  are  very  highly  correlated  -- even  though  they  may  yield  different  orderings  for a
few  sample  observations  (see  for  example  Clarke  1991).  This  applies  also in our case.  By  way  of example,  Figure
5 plots  the  Gini  coefficient  against  the  ratio  of  the  income  share of the richest  20 percent  of the population  to that
of the  poorest  40 percent,  for those  countries  in our sample  for which  both kinds  of data are  available.  The  plot
reveals  a strong  positive  association  between  both distribution  measures;  indeed,  their  correlation  coefficient
7As is  well  known,  Kuznets'  explanation  of  his  empirical  finding  was  based  on  the  shift  of  population  from
traditional  to  modern  activities.  See  Anand  and  Kanbur  (1993)  for an  analytical  reassessment  of  this  view.
For  a discussion  of  the  properties  of  these  indices  see  for  example  Cowell  (1971).6
equals  .95,  so that they  are  virtually  indistinguishable.
To sunmarize  this section,  our  data  conform  to three  stylized  facts  found  in cross-country  studies.  First,
saving rates appear  to rise with development  (as measured  by per capita GNP)  -- at least at its early  stages.
Second,  saving  rates  and growth  rates are  positively  correlated  across  countries.  Third,  income  inequality  seems
to rise  at early  stages  of development,  and  decline  beyond  certain  levels  of per capita  income,  as predicted  by the
'Kuznets  curve'.
For  the  overall  sample,  we  also  find  a negative  association  between  aggregate  saving  rates  and standard
measures  of income  inequality,  although  the relationship  appears  weaker  than  the above  'stylized  facts', and is
not robust  across  subsamples.  More  importantly,  this refers  only  to the simple  correlation  between  saving  and
income  distribution.  The  more  substantive  question  is whether  the association  between  both variables  continues
to hold  once  other  standard  saving  detenninants  are  taken  into  consideration.  To answer  this question,  we  need
to examine  the  theoretical  underpinnings  of the  saving-inequality  link,  and place  the latter  in a broader  framework
encompassing  other  relevant  determinants  of saving.  This task is undertaken  in the  next section.
III.  Saving and Income Distribution: A Brief  Survey
Aggregate  saving is the outcome  of individual  saving  efforts  by heterogeneous  members  of different
classes  of savers. Heterogeneity  among  savers  is a key feature  that helps understand  how  aggregate  saving  is
affected  by changes  in saving  determinants,  including  policies.  Heterogeneity  may be related  to the fact that
different  types  of individuals  determine  their consumption/saving  plans according  to different  objectives  (i.e.,
their preferences  are not identical).  Altematively,  even if all individuals  possess identical  preferences,  their
behavior  may  differ  because  they  face different  institutional  constraints  (e.g., in their  access  to borrowing),  or
behavior  may vary depending  on the values  of exogenous  variables  relevant  for their consumption/saving
decisions  (e.g.,  no saving  can  be made  below  a certain  threshold  of income  needed  for subsistence).
Heterogeneity  is of course  important  because  when  agents  are  dissimilar  the aggregate  levels  of those
variables  relevant  for individual  saving  decisions  are not sufficient  to determine  aggregate  saving  -- the latter
also depends  on the distribution  of such variables  across  individual  savers. Even  if all agents  had identical
preferences,  distribution  still matters as long as their (common)  decision  rule for saving  is not linear  in the
relevant  variables.  In such  case,  a given  change  in  the  aggregate  value  of a saving  determinant  (such  as disposable
income  or wealth)  can have  very different  consequences  for aggregate  saving  depending  on how it impacts
different  types  of savers.  Likewise,  purely  redistributive  policies  can  have  an impact  on aggregate  saving  -- e.g.,
public transfers to the poor financed  by taxes  on the  rich  may  reduce  total saving  if the former  have a higher
propensity  to spend  than  the latter.7
Below  we  review  briefly  the  literature  on  consumption  and saving  determination,  with a focus  on income
(or  wealth)  distribution  in particular.  We  adopt  an aggregate  perspective,  although  some reference  is made  to the
distinction  between  private  and public  saving,  or firm  and household  saving,  where  relevant.  Our approach  is
seective  rather  than  exstive.  We first examine  the  relationship  between  saving  and three  basic  determinants:
income,  the rate of retum,  and uncertainty 9. Then  we highlight  different  channels  through  which  distribution
affects  the relationship  between  these  two basic  variables  and aggregate  saving.  We conclude  with some  brief
remarks  on the influence  of standard  economic  policies  on saving,  discussing  how  their impact  is affected  by
distributive  factors.
I1I.1  Basic  saving  determinants
Income
Income  or wealth  is the main  driving  force  behind  consumption  (and  hence  saving)  and therefore  has
attracted  the largest  attention  among  all potential  saving  determinants.  But beyond  this very general  statement
there  is very  little  in common  among  different  saving  theories.  The  differences  start with the appropriate  measure
of income:  current  income  (in  the  conventional  Keynesian  hypothesis,  henceforth  KH),  permanent  income  net of
taxes  over  the  life-cycle  (the  life-cycle  hypothesis,  LCH),  permanent  income  net of taxes over an infinite  horizon
(the permanent-income  hypothesis,  PIH) or, as a variant of the latter,  pemanent income  net of govenment
spending  over an infinite  horizon  (REH,  the Ricardian-equivalence  hypothesis).
As a starting  benchmark  consider  either  the  PIH or its REH  variant  for a representative  consumer.'°  A
rise  in  net  permanent  income  leads  to a propoftional  increase  in consumption  levels  without  any effect  on saving.
Temporaly  income  changes  are  smoothed  out  through  appropriate  levels  of saving.  If both current  and permanent
income  rise by the same  amount,  consumption  and saving  ratios  to current  income  remain  unaltered;  in turn,
purely  temnporary  income  changes  result  in movements  of the saving  (consumption)  ratio in the same  (opposite)
direction.
According  to the PIH,  income  growth -- i.e.,  the increase  of future  income  relative  to current  income
levels -- must reduce  saving  rates, as consumers  raise current  consumption  in anticipation  of higher  future
income.  This,  however,  is at odds  with  the positive  saving-growth  correlation  observed  in the data  and reviewed
9  Uncertainty  refers  basically  to  the  variability  of  income  and  the  rate  of  return,  and  therefore  is really  not a
separate  variable.  However,  because  the  literature  emphasizes  the  distinction  between  the  effects  on saving  of income
(or  rate  of  return)  variability  and  those  of  their  respective  levels,  we  treat  them  separately.
10  See  Friedman  (1957),  Hall  (1978)  and  Flavin  (I1981).8
in the  previous  section,  and  has  prompted  several  lines  of research  attempting  to explain  why  rational  consumers
may  fail  to adjust  their  consumption  levels  in the face of rising  income.  '  The  explanations  are  mostly  based  on
non-standard  preferences  incorporating  consumption  habits  (wiuch  prevent  rapid  changes  in consumption  levels),
subsistence  consumption  levels  (below  which  no saving  whatsoever  takes  place,  so that the saving  propensity  is
effectively  zero)  or wealth  as an argument  of the  utility  function  (the  classical  "capitalist  spirit"  model).  Under
each  of  these  fomlulations,  higher  income  can  generate  inceases  in  saving,  at least  transitorily.  On  the other  hand,
as we shall see later, once the representative-agent  framework  is abandoned,  some of these preference
specifications  provide  possible  channels  through  which  income  distribution  could  affect  overall  saving.
Atthe  other  end  of the  theoretical  spectrum  is  the LCH  of Modigliani  and  Brumberg  (1954, 1979)  -- the
main  competitor  of the  PIH-REH  theories.  As opposed  to the representative-agent  framework  of the latter,  agent
heterogeneity  is the cornerstone  of the LCH.  Aggregate  saving  results  from  the addition  of saving  by different
age-specific  cdoorts.  Each  cohort  smooths  consumption  over a finite  horizon,  given  lifetime  resources  that -- in
the  simple  LCH  hypothesis  -- are  not transferred  across  generations.  Over  the life  cycle,  saving  and consumption
follow  hump-shaped  patterns,  with dissaving  at young  age, the peak  of saving  at working  age,  and dissaving
duing re=remut as  households  run  down  their  accumulated  assets.  Hence  saving  propensities  depend  on age  and
differ  systematically  across  cohorts.
The  impact  of growth  on saving  in the  LCH  framnework  is ambiguous.  On the  one hand,  the earnings  and
saving  of the  working-age  population  will  rise relative  to retirees'  dissaving,  thus  pushing  up aggregate  saving.
On the other hand, however,  workers  will anticipate  higher  earnings  during  their working  age, and this will
depress  their  saving  just like in the PIH  framework.  The  overall  effect  is therefore  indeterminate.
As mentioned  earlier,  there  is of course  an altemative  interpretation  of why  standard  models  of saving
have  such a hard time generating  a positive  growth-saving  association.  Rather  than  saving  behavior,  the latter
could  just reflect  the combination  of two well-established  empirical  facts: the positive  association  between
investment  and growth  (Levine and Renelt 1992) and the equally positive saving-investment  correlation
(Feldstein  and  Horioka  1980,  Feldstein  and  Bachetta  1990),  often  interpreted  as evidence  of intemational  capital
immobility  (see Schmidt-Hebbel,  Serven  and Solimano  1996).
T7he  rate of return
The  second  key factor  governing  the intertemporal  allocation  of consumption,  and  hence  saving,  is the
rate of return.  However,  its impact  on saving  in the representative-agent  framework  of the PIH is ambiguous,
II See  Carroll  and  Weil  (1994)  and  Deaton  (1995).9
because  changes  in the  rate  of  return  have  both income  and substitution  effects,  which  run in opposite  directions
(except  in particular  cases, like  when  the consumer  is a net debtor).  The  situation  is similarly  ambiguous  in the
LCH  fraewvrk  Here  changes  in interest  rates  entail  transfers  among  cohorts,  and the net impact  on aggregate
consumption  and  saving  depends  on  the  different  cohorts'  saving  propensities  as well  as on their  relative  size  (see
Deaton 1992).  In practice,  empirical  studies  support  these  theoretical  ambiguities,  and typically  fail to find
significant  effects  of interest  rate changes  on saving.
Recent  work  by Ogaki,  Ostry  and  Reinhart  (1994)  adds  a new  dimension  to the  effect  of the rate of return
on saving.  They  present  a model  in which  the  elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution  (and  hence  the interest  rate
sensitivity  of saving)  rises with  the level  of income.  Empirical  estimation  of the model  on a cross-country  data
set provides  some  support  for this view.
Uncertainty
Recent  work  on saving  has moved  away  from  the simple  versions  of the PIH and LCH  models  toward
broader  frameworks  incaporating  uncertainty  about  future  income,  the  rate of return  to savings,  the length  of life,
etc. One line of work  has relaxed  the certainty-equivalent  utility  function  of Hall's (1978)  PIH, allowing  the
marginal  utility  of consumption  to be nonlinear,  typically  convex. This convexity  creates  precautionary  motives
for saving  whenever  uncertainty  about  future  consumption  is introduced:  it is prudent  for individuals  to limit
borrowing  and not consume  too much  until  they  know  more  about  their future  -- an effect  that is stronger  the
greater  the  uncertainty  about  lifetime  income.  2
Tlhe  existence  of the precautionary  motive  for savings  is less in doubt  than its actual  magnitude.  While
empirical  testing has been limited,  it is likely  that precautionary  saving  may represent  well  the short-term
consumption-smoothing  behavior  of the average  consumer,  but not explain  the bulk of saving,  which  in most
societies  appears  to be carried  out  by a relatively  small  number  of wealthier  households  (see  Carroll  and Summers
1991  and  Deaton  1995).
111.2  Income  distribution and saving
Let  us now  focus  in more  detail  on the impact  of changes  in the distribution  of income  (or  wealth)  on
aggregate  saving.  We examine  four  topics:  (i) links  between  saving  and the unctional  distribution  of income;
2 UnRlike  in the  sirnple  PIH,  in  this  framework  intertemporal  transfers  of  resources  that  leave  the  present  value
of  lifetime  income  unaffected  can  still  affect  saving  behavior.  Higher  present  taxes  with  lower  future  taxes  lead  to a
decline  in consumption  if individuals  have  to rebuild  their  precautionary  balances  (and  cannot  borrow  against  the  future
tax  break).10
(ii) links between  saving  and the  personal distribution  of income;  (iii) liquidity  constraints,  distribution  and
saving;  and  (iv) indirect  effects  of distribution  on saving.
Fundional  distribution  and  saving
The link between  the functional  distribution  of income  and saving  (and growth)  is at the heart  of the
neoclassical  gowth  model  (Solow  1956),  as well  as the  neo-Keynesian  growth  models  of Lewis  (1954),  Kaldor
(1957) and Pasinetti  (1962). These  models  are general-equilibrium  in nature, with both saving  and income
distribution  as endogenous  variables.
Unlike the neo-Keynesian  models,  in the neoclassical  framework  workers and capitalists  do not
necessarily differ in their saving patterns. Aggregate  saving behavior in conjunction  with production
characteristics  determines  income  distribution.  The reason  is that saving influences  investment  and thus the
capital  stock. An increase  in the  propensity  to save  will  increase  the long-run  capital-labor  ratio, and  capital's
income  share  will  rise  or fall depending  on whether  the  elasticity  of factor  substitution  is greater  or smaller  than
one, respectively.
By  contrast,  the  neo-Keynesian  giwth models  of Lewis  and Kaldor  assume  from the  outset  that workers
and capitalists  have  different  saving  behavior." 3 Lewis  (1954)  argues  that most saving  comes  from  the profits
of  the  entrepreneurs  in the  modem,  industrial  sector  of the economy,  who  save a high fraction  of their  incomes,
while  other  groups  in the  economy  save  less.  The  more  fervent  the  activities  of the capitalists,  the faster  does  the
distribution  of income  tilt toward  profits,  increasing  the aggregate  saving  ratio. Income  redistribution  from  the
low-saving  group  to the entrepreneurs  raises  aggregate  saving.
Likewise,  in the  simplest  form  of Kaldor's  (1957)  model,  workers  spend  what they  earn (their  propensity
to save  is zero)  and  the  share  of profits  in national  income  depends  positively  on the investment-output  ratio and
inversely  on  the  propensity  to save  of the  capitalists.  Thus,  like  in Lewis'  model,  an increase  in investment  raises
the income  share  of profits  at the  expense  of the wage  share,  and the  more  the capitalists  spend,  the more  they
earn  -- the  "widow's  cruse"  is never  empty.
Pasinetti  (1962)  assumes  that  saving  propensities  differ  among  classes  of individuals,  rather  than  classes
of ineone. Workers'  saving  is not zero;  indeed,  they  are assumed  to own  shares  on the capital  stock  and receive
part of the profits.  Nevertheless,  the implications  for the share  of profits in income  are the same  obtained  by
13  See  Marglin  (1984)  for  in-depth  analyses  of the  classical,  neoclassical,  no-Marxian,  and  neo-Keynesian  approaches.I1
Kaldcr.  The  fact  that  workers  save  does  influence  the  distribution  of income  between  capitalists  and workers,  but
does  not influence  the  distribution  of income  between  profits  and  wages.
While these neo-Keynesian  models  establish a clear relation  between  the functional  distribution  of
income  and saving,  it is worth  noting that their implications  in terms  of the inequality-saving  link are less
automatic.  The  reason  is that in many  societies  wage  earners  do not necessarily  represent  the poorer  segments
of  the  population,  which  are  likely  to include  instead  small  rural  landowners  and self-employed  individuals  in the
informal sector.  As a result,  the association  between  the functional  and personal  distributions  of income  is
empirically  rather  weak  (Atkinson  1994).
Personal  Distribution  and Saving
With consumer  heterogeneity,  standard  consumption  theories  also generate  links between  personal
income  distribution  and  aggregate  saving  that, unlike  the classical  theories  just referred  to, do not depend  on the
exogmous  distinction  of two groups  of savers  and non-savers.  These  links  result  from a non-linear  relationship
between  individual  saving  and income,  which can have  different  sources,  but in most cases -- although  not
invariably  -- leads  to a positive  relationship  between  inequality  and aggregate  saving.
A starting  point  is again  the LCH,  amended  to include  bequests.  The  latter  were absent  from  the early
formulations  of the LCH  because  they  were thought  insignificant.  Only 20 percent  of total U.S. wealth  was
believed  to come  from  bequests,  with the remaining  80 percent  due to the saving  of living  individuals.  More
recent  studies  have  virtually  reversed  this 20-80  rule  to 80-20  (Kotlikoff  and Summers  1981, 1988).  This is an
i.nportant  finding  from  the  theoretical  viewpoint  because,  with  a fully  developed  intergenerational  bequest  motive,
the  distinction  between  the  LCH  and  the  PIH  virtally vanishes,  as different  age cohorts  become  mutually  linked.
The  view  that bequests  as a saving  motive  are more  important  than life-cycle  considerations,  and that
the elasticity  of bequests  with  respect  to lifetime  resources  exceeds  unity  helps  explain  a number  of empirical
puzzles  on  the  LCH  model  (see  Deaton  1992  and 1995  for further  discussion  and references).  First, there  is little
evidence  that the old  dissave,  as implied  by the simple  LCH;  on the contrary,  their  saving  rates appear  to be as
high or even  higher  than  those  of young  households.  Second,  if bequests  are a luxury  (at least  over a relevant
wealth  range),  saving  rates  should  be higher  among  wealthier  consumers  and richer  countries  than in the rest,
which  empirically  seems  to be the  case.  Third,  the fact that saving  appears  to be concentrated  among  relatively
few  richer  households,  who  may  be accumulating  mostly  for dynastic  motives,  is also in agreement  with a central
role  of bequests  in driving  saving.
If bequests  by  the  wealthy  are  a chief  force  behind  saving,  as this  literature  suggests,  the situation  is close
to that  described  by the  "capitalist  spirit"  model  mentioned  earlier,  in which  wealth  is accumulated  for its own12
sake  (see,  for  example,  Zou 1993),  and  higher  wealth  prompts  further  accumulation  -- because  consumption  and
wealth  are  gross  substitutes  in the  agent's  utility  function.  More  generally,  the apparent  concentration  of saving
in a small group  of richer  individuals  suggests  that a better  understanding  of their  saving  behavior  is essential
to understand  aggregate  saving  patterns.
The  key  issue  is that if the elasticity  of bequests  with  respect  to lifetime  resources  is greater  than unity
(so  that  bequests  are  a lwaury  good),  inoorne  redistribution  from  rich  to poor  will  unambiguously  reduce  aggregate
saving  (Blinder  1975).  As we shall  see  later, this view  has received  some  empirical  support.
An  altemative  route  through  which  income  distribution  may  matter  for aggregate  saving  was suggested
by Becker  (1975).  If there  are  decreasing  returns  to human  capital,  the poor  will  invest  relatively  more  in human
capital than the rich. Since  human  capital expenditures  are considered  as consumption  in standard  national
accounting,  the neasured  saving  rates  of the  poor will  appear  lower  than  those  of the  rich,  even  if their  "ovaall"
saving  rates (including  human  capital  accumulation)  are  identical.
In  turn,  precautionary  saving  also implies  a link  between  distribution  and  saving.  Consumers  with low
assets  tend  to compress  consumption  to avoid  running  down  their  precautionary  balances,  so that their  marginal
propensity  to consume  out of income  is higher  than  that of those  consumers  holding  large  asset stocks  -- they
would  devote  most  of any  extra  income  to consumption.  Thus  redistribution  from  the  wealthy  to the poor would
depress  overall  saving.  The  opposite  could  happen,  however,  if the poor  face  greater  uncertainty,  are  more  risk-
averse,  or have  more  limited  access  to risk diversification  than  the rich;  in such  circumstances,  a transfer  from
the latter to the former  would  lead  to higher  aggregate  saving.  A related  view,  advanced  by Friedman  (1957),
holds  that, if the cross-sectional  distribution  of income  reflects  future  income  uncertainty,  then  greater  income
inequality  should  raise  precautionary  saving.
Consumption  habits,  whose  theoretical  interest  lies  mainly  in their ability  to generate  positive  saving-
growth correlations  through  the slow adjustment  of consumption' 4, also have implications  for the saving-
distribution link. This can be most clearly  seen in an LCH framework.  Consumption  is costlier for young
households  -- because  the  habit  it  induces  has  to be fed for the  rest of life  -- and cheaper  for old consumers.  Thus
the  young  will  tend  to save  more  than  the  old, and income  redistribution  from the  latter  to the former  will  raise
overall  saving.  Redistribution  from  rich  to poor can  also raise  saving  under  the (not too implausible)  assumption
that habits make it more  difficult  to adjust  future  consumption  down  than  up. In such case,  richer  consumers
would reduce their  consumption  level  by the full amount  of the transfer,  while poorer  consumers  would be
reluctant  to raise  their  consumption  by the same  amount.
14 See  Carroll  and  Weil  (1994)  and  Carroll,  Overland  and  Weil  (1994).13
Borrowing  constraints,  saving and distribution
The inability  of some consumers  to borrow  forges  a powerful  link  between  income  distribution  and
saving.  Consumption  models  with borrowing  constraints  divide  consumers  into savers  and non-savers.  Unlike
in the classical  models  of functional  income  distribution,  however,  this does not arise from the exogmous
distinction  of  two  classes  of people  or  preferwes, but from  the  distribution  of preferences  among  the  population,
interest  rates,  the variability  of earnings,  and  their  rate of growth.
Borrowing  constraints  act in a way similar  in many  respects  to the precautionary  saving  motive.  Given
the inability  to borrow,  consumers  use assets  to buffer  consumption,  accumulating  when  times are  good and
running them down to protect consumption  when earnings  are low. In the theoretical  models,  bofrowing
constraints  mostly  affect  impatient  consumers  who  face  high earnings  growth  (Deaton  1991).
The  empirical  relevance  of borrowing  constraints  is well  established However,  they  help  explain  mostly
short-term  saving  for consumption  buffering,  not long-term  saving for old-age  or for bequests.  For example,
Hayashi  (1985)  finds  that for  a significant  fraction  of the Japanese  population  the behavior  of consumption  over
tie  is consistent  with the  existence  of credit  rationing  and  differential  borrowing  and lending  rates.  Borowing
cmnstraits  appear  particularly  imrtant  with  regard  to saving  for  housing  purchases.  Jappelli  and Pagano  (1994)
show  that  credit  constaints  reflected  in housing  nortgage  regulations  are an important  explanatory  factor  behind
cross-country  differences  in saving.
In  practice,  bcrrowing  constraints  affect  mostly  poorer  households,  and not the rich  who  hold  large  asset
stocks. Thus, like  the precautionary  saving  motive,  borrowing  constraints  likely  are a chief  force  behind  the
saving  behavior  of lower-  and  middle-income  groups,  but  not  richer  households.  Income  redistribution  away  fron
the  latter  makes  the  bcowing constraints  less likely  to bind and reduces  the importance  of buffer-stock  saving,
thus  lowering  aggregate  saving  rates.
Indirect links
Other  recent  literature  brings  out some  indirect  links  between  distribution  and saving  operating  through
third  variables  that affect saving.  One particularly  active  line  of research  is the  "political  economy"  literature,
which  has underscored  the positive  association  between  income  equality  and economic  growth  in a framework
of  endogenous  growth  and endogenous  economic  policy'
5 . In  this approach,  causality  runs from  distribution  to
5For  a general  overview  of  the  different  strands  of  the  literature  on  income  distribution  and  growh,  se Solimno
(1995).14
growth  via investment.  In addition,  these  models  include  a political  mechanism  which  provides  a link  between
income  inequality  and  economic  policy.
The main line of argument  is that a highly  unequal  distribution  of income  and wealth  causes social
tension  and  political  instability  (violent  protests,  coups,  etc.);  the  result  is a discouragement  of investment  through
imaeased  uncutaity, along  with  adverse  consequences  for productivity  and thus growth (Persson  and Tabellini
1994,  Alesina  and Rodrik 1994,  Perotti  1995,  Alesina  and Perotti  1996).  In addition,  income  distribution  may
affect  growth  also through  taxation  and government  expenditure:  in a more  unequal  society  there is greater
demand for redistribution  and therefore  higher  taxation,  lower  returns  to investments  in physical  and human
capital,  and  less investment  and growth.
These  arguments  have  received  some  empircal  support.  From  the  point  of view  of saving,  the implication
is that if saving  is positively  dependent  on growth  -- or, alternatively,  if saving  reflects  in part the investment
decisions  of firms -- then  higher  inequality  will,  through  the above  channels,  depress  aggregate  saving -- in
contrast  with the positive  impact of inequality  on saving  implied  by most of the theories  examined  so far.
Additionally,  distributive  inequality  may also  tend  to lower  public saving,  as govemrments  engage  more  actively
in redistributive  expenditures  -- as in the  populist  experiences  examined  by Dombusch  and Edwards  (1991).
It is important  to note  that the existence  of an inverse  relationship  between  inequality  and investment,
as suggested  by the above  literature,  could  also imply a negative  association  between  inequality  and saving
through  firms'  earnings  retention.  The  latter  is typically  the primary  source  of financing  for private  investment,
so  that if higher  inequality  lowers  investment  it should  also reduce  firm  saving.  What  happens  with  aggregate
saving,  however,  depends  on  whether  firm  owners  (i.e.,  households)  can  pierce the  "corporate  veil"  that separates
houschold  and  firm  decisions.  If this is the case,  a fall  in firm  saving  could  be fully  offset  by a rise in household
saving,  leaving  aggregate  saving  unaffected.
IV  Empirical Studies
Empirical  tests of the impact  of income  distribution  on saving are rather scarce.  Some  early studies
followed  the Kaldor-Lewis  approach  and focused  on the functional  distribution  of income.  Along  these  lines,
Houthakker  (1961),  Williamson  (1968),  Kelley  and  Williamson  (1968)  and Gupta  (1970) found  some  evidence
that the propensity  to save from  non-labor  income  exceeds  that from  labor  income.
More  recent  empirical  studies  focus  on the  effect  of personal  income  inequality  on saving.  For  the most
part,  they  find  eitdr no effects  or a positive  impact,  although  in the  latter  case  the estimates  often  are  statistically
insignificant  at conventional  levels.15
Blinder (1975) uses U.S. time-series  data for 1949-1970  to estimate an equation for aggregate
consunption  including  income  distribution  indicators.  He  finds  that higher  inequality  appears  to raise  aggregate
consumption  (and thus lower  saving),  although  the estimated  effect  is in general  statistically  insignificant.  He
attributes this result to the lack of correspondence  between  his analytical  framework  -- which predicts  the
opposite  result  -- and  his  empirical  model,  and proposes  as a preferable  empirical  test the  estimation  of separate
consumption  equations  by income  class. This suggestion  is taken  up by Menchik  and David  (1983),  who  use
disaggregated  U.S.  data  to test  directly  whether  the  elasticity  of bequests  to lifetime  resources  is larger  or smaller
for  the  rich  than  for other  income  groups.  They  find  that the marginal  propensity  to bequeath  is unambiguously
higher  for the  wealthy,  so that higher  inequality  leads  to higher  lifetime  aggregate  saving.
A related  approach  is that of Bunting  (1991),  who  uses  consumer  expenditure  survey  data for the  U.S.
to estimate  consumption  as a function  of income  level  and distribution  by income  quintile. He finds strong
evidence  that  household  spending  depends  on both the level  and  distribution  of income:  the estimated  marginal
propensities  to cansume  uniformly  decline  (and  propensities  to save  therefore  rise) as the quintile  share  of income
rises. The coefficients  are highly  significant,  and the model  explains  over half of the variation  in household
consumption  in the sample.
Two  early  studies  by Della  Valle  and Oguchi  (1976)  and Musgrove  (1980)  use cross-country  data  on
both  industrial  and  developing  countries  to investigate  the  relationship  between  saving  and income  distribution.
In  both  cases  the  results  show  no statistically  significant  effect  of income  distribution  on saving. The  exception
are  the  OECD  countries  included  in  the  study  by Della  Valle  and  Oguchi,  for which  they  find some  evidence  that
increased  inequality  may  increase  saving;  Gersovitz  (1988)  suggests  that their  failure  to obtain  a similar  result
for  the  developing  countries  may  be due to poor quality  of the  corresponding  income  distribution  data. In  turn.
Lim  (1980)  finds  that inequalitv  tends to raise aggregate  saving  rates in a cross-section  samnple  of developing
countries,  but his coefficient  estimates  are significant  at conventional  levels  only  in some  subsamples.
Venieris  and  Gupta  (1986)  examine  the pattern  of average  saving  propensities  across  income  groups  in
a cross-section  sample  of 49 countries,  using  an econometric  specification  that includes  also political  instability
as a saving  determinant.  Their  results show that poorer  households  have  the lowest  saving  propensities,  but
somewhat  surprisingly  they  also  find  that  the  highest  average  saving  propensity  corresponds  to the middle-income
group,  so  that  redistribution  against  the  rich  may  raise  or lower  the aggregate  saving  ratio  depending  on whether
the favored  group  is the middle  class or the poor,  respectively.  However,  the interpretation  of their  results is
somewhat  unclear  due to their use of constant-price  saving as the dependent  variable,  which  has no clear
analytical  justification.16
Sahota  (1993)  tests  a reduced-form  relationship  between  saving  and income  distribution  controlling  for
the  effects  of per capita  income  on  saving.  Using  data  on  65 industrial  and developing  countries  for the  year 1975,
he regresses  the saving/GDP  ratio  on the Gini coefficient  and a quadratic  polynomial  in per capita  income  (he
includes  also  regional  dummy  variables  to  remove  cultural  and  habit  effects). The  parameter  estimate  on the Gini
coefficient  is found  to be positive,  implying  a positive  impact  of inequality  on aggregate  saving,  but the estimate
is somewhat  imprecise  and significantly  different  from zero  only  at the 10%  level.
More  recently,  Cook  (1995)  presents  estimates  of the impact  of inequality  on aggregate  saving  ratios  in
LDCs  from  a conventional  saving  equation  including  also the level  and growth  rate of real income, dependency
ratios,  and  a measure  of  capital  inflows.  A dummy  for  Latin American  countries  is also added  to the  regressions,
although  its  justification  is unclear  since  no  other  regional  dummies  are  included.  Using  decade  averages  for the
1970s  for 49 developing  countries,  he finds a positive  and significant  effect of inequality  on saving,  which
appears  robust  to some  changes  in specification  and to the choice  of alternative  indicators  of income  inequality.
Finally,  Hong  (1995)  reports  econometric  results  on the effect  of income  inequality  on gross domestic
saving  ratios  in cross-country  samples  of 56 to 64 developing  and industrial  countries,  using 1960-85  averages
for  each  country.  He  finds  that  the  income  share  of the top 20%  of the  population  has a positive  effect  on saving
rates,  controlling  for old-age  dependency,  income  (and/or  education)  level,  and income  growth.
V  Econometric  Results
In this section  we  present  new  empirical  results  on the cross-country  relationship  between  saving  and
income  distribution.  Our  objective  is to assess  the  impact  on saving  of alternative  income  distribution  indicators,
after controlling  for income  and  demographic  variables.  Our basic  sample  includes  52 countries  (see the data
appendix).
We limit ourselves  to variants  of simple  specifications  found  in comparable  cross-country  studies  of
saving  (see  e.g. Edwards  1995,  and Masson,  Bayoumi  and Samiel  1995).  The  basic  equation  to be estimated  is
the following:
(1)  GNS/GNP  = ao + a, gnp  +  a2 (gnp)2 +  a3  growth +  a4old +  a.,  young  + a6distrib
where  GNSIGNP  is the  ratio  of current-price  gross national  saving  to current-price  gross  domestic  product,  gnp
is real per capita  gross national  product,  growth is the (geometric)  average  annual  rate of growth  of real per
capita  gross  national  product,  old is the  old-age  dependency  ratio  (ratio  of population  of age  65 and above  to total17
population),  young is the young-age  dependency  ratio  (ratio  of population  of ages  0 to 15  to total population),
and distrib  is an income  distribution  variable.
The basic specification  in (1) embeds  both a linear  and a quadratic  term in real per capita  income  to
encompass  the non-linear  relation  between  the saving  rate and income  described  in section  11;  accordingly,  we
should  expect  a, > 0, a: 2< 0. All  other  variables  enter  linearly  in our  basic equation" 6. The majority  of empirical
studies  suggest  that the coefficient  on growth should  be positive,  while  those on the dependency  ratios  should
be negative,  according  to standard  life-cycle  arguments."
As income  distribution  indicator  we use the Gini  coefficient,  although  we present  also some  regressions
using instead  the ratio of the income  share of the poorest  40 percent  of households  to that of the richest 20
percent,  and the income  share of the middle  60 percent  of the population.  The latter  variables,  however,  are
available  only  for a smaller  sample.
The  correlation  matrix  of our  basic set of regressors  in Table  2 shows  three  striking  features.  First, as
mentioned  above, all three income  distribution  indicators  are very highly  correlated  with each other, with
correlation  coefficients  in all cases  exceeding  .90 in absolute  value.  Second,  the (negative)  correlation  between
young-age  and old-age  dependency  ratios  is also vely large  (-.93). Third,  both dependency  ratios  are closely
correlated  with  real per capita  income  (the  corresponding  correlation  coefficients  exceed  .88).  It will  be useful
to keep  in mind  these  features  of the  data for the  discussion  of the  empirical  results  below.
Table  3 shows  estimation  results  using  the  basic  equation  for a variety  of samples.  As a benchmark,  the
first column  reports parameter  estimates  using a specification  excluding  income  distribution  indicators.  As
expected,  the  second  and  third  rows  show  that  saving  ratios  rise  with income  levels  (a result  also found  by Carroll
and Weil 1994  and Edwards  1995)  but taper off at high income,  as indicated  by the negative  coefficient  on
squared  GNP  per  capita.  Specifically,  the estimates  in column  I imply  that, if the  other  variables  are set at their
sample  means,  the saving  rate peaks  (at a level  around  22 percent)  when  per capita  income  reaches  $9,000  (in
1987  dollars).
In turn,  the  fourth  row  in the  table indicates  that saving  ratios  are positively  associated  across  countries
with  per  capita  GNP  growth  rates.  A 1-percent  increase  in real growth  raises the  national  saving  ratio  by about
16 All  variables  (except  the  variability  of  income  defined  below)  are  measured  by  their  means  over  1965-1994
(or  the  available  sample,  if shorter).
17 See  Leff  (1969)  and  Modigliani  (1970).  The  dependency  ratio  is  often  defined  to include  also  the  population
under  15.  See  Gersovitz  (1988)  for  an  analytical  discussion  of the  effects  of  these  and  other  demographic  variables  on
saving.18
1.5  percentage  points.  Finally, it can be seen from the fifth and sixth rows in column 1 that both young and old-
age dependency  ratios have the expected negative effect on national saving rates.
The simple specification in column I accounts for nearly 60 percent of the observed cross-country
variation  in  national  saving  rates.  However,  the estimated  coefficients  on per capita income and its square, as well
as on the young-age dependency ratio, have rather large standard errors. The obvious reason for this lack of
precision  is the strong cross-correlation between age-dependency  ratios and real income described in Table 2.'"
Indeed,  a  joint F-test  of the null hypothesis  that  young-age  dependency,  real income and real income squared have
no impact on saving  yields a test statistic of 5.49, which overwhelmningly  rejects the null at the I percent level.
Columns  2-4 in Table 3 augment  the specification  in the first column  using the Gini coefficient as income
distribution indicator in different country samples. The sign pattern of the parameter estimates in the first six
rows remains  unchanged,  and the full-sample estimates in column 2 are virtually identical to those in column 1.
However,  the saving-growth  relationship  does not appear  robust  across  country  groups: it is much stronger among
industrial  countries (column  3) than in developing countries (column 4) -- the same cross-country pattem found
bv Carroll  and Weil (1994). Controlling for other factors, a I percent increase in the growth rate raises national
saving  ratios  by 3.3 percentage  points among OECD countries, and by only 1.  I percentage point among LDCs.
The seventh  row reports the parameter estimates for the Gini coefficient. They are positive for the full
sample and the OECD subsample, and negative for LDCs.  In all three cases, however,  they are insignificantly
different  from zero.  As before,  real income,  its square, and the dependency  ratios are not individually significant,
but F-tests cannot reject their joint significance even at the I percent level.
Columns 5 through 7 use as income distribution indicator the ratio of the income shares of the top 20
and  bottom forty  percent  of the population. This results in a loss of seven observations (two industrial countries
and five  developing  countries)  due to unavailability  of the share data. Apart from a general loss of precision, the
estimation  results are otherwise very sumilar  to those obtained usmg the Gini coefficient, as should be expected
in view of the very high correlation reported above between  the two income distribution indicators.
Columns 8 and 9 of Table 3 show the results of excluding from the sample the group of take-off
developing  countries,  which  some might  argue are 'exceptional' from the viewpoint of saving (and also growth).
For both the full and LDC samples in columns 8 and 9, the main consequence is that the estimated coefficient
on growth loses all significance, a finding similar to that reported by Carroll and Weil (1994) when excluding
from their sample the East-Asian 'tigers'. In addition, in the LDC sample (column 9) the estimated coefficient
on the income distribution indicator becomes larger in absolute value and closer to statistical significance,
Is The  correlation  between  real per capita  GNP  and  its square,  not presented  in Table  2, equals  .98.19
suggesting  a negative  effect  of inequality  on saving.  The  interpretation  of this result,  however,  is a bit unclear.
By  dropping  the take-off  countries,  we are  eliminating  eight  of the ten  highest-saving  countries  (see  Figure 1),
so that in effect  we are truncating  the sample  from above.  It is well  known  that in such circumstances  OLS
estimates  are biased,  although  the  direction  of the  bias is not known  in general  (e.g.,  Maddala  1983).
Next we check  the robustness  of our main result  -- that income  inequality  does not affect  aggregate
saving  -- by estimating  altemative  specifications  that have  been  used  in previous  studies.  Table 4 presents  the
results  using  the full  sample.  The first two  columns  explore  possible  non-linear  effects  of income  distribution,
interacting  the Gini  coefficient  with  real per capita  income  and adding  a quadratic  term,  respectively.  Neither
specification  proved  successful.  Column  3 adds income  variability  to the  basic set of regressors,  with  variability
measured  by the standard  deviation  of real per capita  GNP around  trend relative  to the average  GNP level;
according  to the precautionary  saving  motive,  it should  have a positive  impact  on saving  ratios.  In fact, the
estimated  coefficient  is negative  but insignificant.  The  likely  reason  is that aggregate  income  variability  is very
different  from  -- actually  much lower  than  -- individual  income  variability,  as shown by Pischke  (1995).
Column  4 introduces  regional  dummies,  as done  for example  by Sahota  (1993),  with industrial  countries  as the
omitted  category.  However,  the  durmnies  are not significant,  either  individually  or jointly  (a joint F-test  yields
F(3, 42)=0.681,  far below conventional  significance  levels).  The last two columns  in Table 4 investigate
alternative  inequality  indicators:  column  5 uses the income  share  of the  middle  class,  and column  6 adds to this
the  ratio  of income  shares  of the top 20 and bottom  40 percent  of the  population.  In neither  case do we find any
significant  effects  on saving.
As a final  check  on our results,  and also  to facilitate  comparability  with  other  empirical  studies,  Table
5 presents  estimation  results  using  gross domestic  saving  and  real per capita  GDP  as the relevant  measures  of
saving and income,  respectively.  The  first two columns  estimate  our basic specification  on the full and LDC
sample, respectively.  As can  be seen,  the main  difference  with the  estimation  results  in Table  3 is the loss  of
significance  of income  growth  as a saving  determinant.  For  the full  sample,  the parameter  estimate  on the  Gini
coefficient  is very  similar  to that  reported  by Sahota  ( 1993),  but falls  far short  of statistical  significance.  For  the
LDC  sample,  the estimate  turns  positive  (recall  that it was  negative  when  using  the national  saving  ratio as the
dependent  variable),  but its precision  is extremely  poor.
The  remaining  columns  in Table  5 report  alternative  specifications  adding  income  variability  (computed
now  on the  basis  of real  GDP),  regional  dummies,  and  using  the  ratio  of income  shares  as indictor  of distribution.
The  main  novelties  are  that  the  estimated  coefficient  on income  variability  has the  correct  (positive)  sign,  and the20
regional  dummies  are individually  sigmficant.  In every  specification,  however,  we fail to find any significant
effects  of income  distribution  on saving.' 9
Our  findings  stand  in stark  contrast  to some  of the  recent  empirical  literature  reviewed  above  (including
Lim 1980,  Venieris  and Gupta 1986,  Sahota  1993,  Cook 1995,  and Hong 1995)  that finds  a positive  effect  of
income  concentration  on saving.  Our  deviation  from this literature  -- that seems  robust to altemative  saving
measures  and specifications  -- is likely  due to our use of the new and  better cross-country  data set on income
distribution  constructed  by Deininger  and Squire  (1995).
VI  Concluding  Remarks
Recent  theoretical  and  empircal  literature  has  examined  the links  between  inequality  and investment  and
inequality  and  growth  However,  less attention  has ben paid to the relationship  between  saving  and distribution.
Yet  it is hard  to understand  aggregate  consumption  and  saving  without  taking  into  account  the fact  that they  result
from the  behavior  of heterogeneous  microeconomic  agents,  a fact that makes  income  distribution  a potentially
important  factor  behind  overall  consumption  and saving.
This  paper  has  reviewed  analyfically  and  empirically  the link  between  income  distribution  and aggregate
saving.  While  systematic  explorations  of this  issue  have  been  mostly  confined  to Neo-Keynesian  growth  models,
the paper has argued  that, once  the conventional  representative-agent  framework  is abandoned,  consumption
theory  brings  out  a number  of  channels  through  which  income  inequality  can  affect  saving.  Further,  in most cases
the relationship  that arises  can be expected  to be positive,  so that on theoretical  grounds  higher  inequality  is,
ceteris paribus, likely  to be associated  with higher  saving.
The  paper  has  also  presented  new  econometric  evidence  on the saving-inequality  link.  Using  a new  data
set on income  distribution for a large  cross-country  sample,  on the whole  we do not find evidence  of any
significant association  between standard  inequalit- indicators and saving ratios, once other key saving
determinants  are taken  into  consideration.  This conclusion  holds for a variety  of samples,  income  distribution
indicators,  and empirical  specifications.
There are, however,  some caveats that make our empirical  results tentative.  First, because  of the
unavailability  for most countries  of long  time-series  on income  distribution,  only  the cross-country  dimension
of the data has been  exploited  here.  While  this entails  some loss  of information,  it is well known  that income
distribution  indicators  generally  display  little  variation  over  time relative  to that across  countries,  and thus on the
19  The  same  result  was  obtained  in other  regressions  (not  reported)  using  alternatively  the income  shares  of the
top  20, middle  60, and  bottom  40 percent  of the population  as inequality  indicators.21
whole  we  do  not think  that omission  of the  time dimension  has any major  consequences  for our results.  Second,
our  emnpirical  estimates  -- like  those  reported  in  the vast majority  of the literature  on saving  -- are  based on the
implicit  assumption  that causality  runs  from income,  growth  and  distribution  to saving.  While  we are  aware  of
the  potential  simultaneity  between  these  variables,  we  also believe  that the search  for valid  instruments  is not a
trivial  task,  and  we  leave  it for  future  work Third,  related  to this, our empirical  estimates  focus  only  on the direct
effects of inequality  on saving ratios, ignoring  possible indirect effects operating  through other saving
determinants  - like,  for example,  the negative  impact  of inequality  on growth  that the  recent  political-economy
literature  suggests.  To explore  the  total  effect  of inequality  on saving  in a satisfactory  manner  one would  need
an analytical  and empirical  framework  encompassing  these  indirect  channels.
Ideally,  the starting  point  to address  the latter  two  caveats  would  be to specify  a complete  theoretical
model  describing,  as a minimum,  the  determination  not only of saving,  but also of the distribution  of income  and
its growth  rate. This,  however,  is likely  to be a formidable  task,  well  beyond  the scope  of this paper.
Data  Appendix
The  variables  introduced  in  sections  II and  V and  their  definitions  and  sources  are  the  following:
Variable  Name  Definition  and  Source
Gross  domestic  saving  ratio  gross  domestic  savings  relative  to gross  domestic  product  in
current  prices,  average  over  1960-94;  The  World  Bank
Gross  national  saving  ratio  gross  national  savings  including  net  current  transfers  relative  to
gross  national  product  in current  prices,  average  over  1965-94;
The  World  Bank
Real  GDP  per capita  in  constant 1987 U.S. dollars, average over 1960-94; The World
Bank
Real GNP  per capita  in  constant 1987 U.S. dollars, average over  1965-94; The World
Bank
Real  GDP  per  capita  growth  rate  average  over  1960-9422
Real GNP per capita growth rate  average over 1965-94
Gini coefficient  and Income Share of  average over 1965-94; Deininger and Squire
Top 20% / Bottom 40% of Population
Income share of Middle 60% of  average over 1965-94; Deininger and Squire
Population
Old age dependency  ratio  population  aged  65  and  over  relative  to  total  population,  average
over 1965-94; The World  Bank
Young age dependency  ratio  population aged 14 and below relative to total population,
average over 1965-94; The World Bank
GDP variability  ratio  of  standard deviation  of  residuals  of  regression  of  real  GDP
per capita on time trend to real GDP; authors'calculation.
GNP variability  ratio  of  standard deviation  of  residuals  of  regression  of  real  GNP
per capita on time trend to real GNP; authors'calculation.
The number of countries in the full sample is 52.  The country classification is the following. OECD countries:
Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Dernmark,  Finland, France, Germany,  Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,  Netherlands, New
Zealand,  Norway,  Portugal,  Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. Take-Off countries: Chile, China, Hong
Kong,  Indonesia,  Korea  (Rep.),  Malaysia,  Mauritius,  Singapore,  Thailand  and Taiwan, China. Other developing countries:
Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco,
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, Zambia.
Not all countries  have Gini and Income Distribution measures available for each year. Countries are included in
the sample  only  if they  have at least one observation  in each of two different decades.  The distribution of countries according
to the number of annual observations is the following: 38 (31) countries with less than 10 Gini (Income Distribution)
observations,  1  I (11) countries with 10 to 20 Gini (Income Distribution) observations, and 3 (3) countries with more than
20 Gini (Income Distribution) observations.23
References
Adelman,  I. and  S. Robinson  (1989):  "Income  Distribution  and  Development."  in H. Chenery  and  T.N.
Srinivasan  (eds.):  Handbook  of Development  Economics.  New York:  North-Holland.
Alesina,  A. and  R. Perotti  (1996):  "Income  Distribution,  Political  Instability,  and Investment",  Eurpan  Ecoomic
Review forthcoming.
Alesina,  A. and  D. Rodrik  (1994):  "Distributive  Politics  and  Economic  Growth."  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics  109,
465-90.
Anand  and  Kanbur  (1993)  in JDE:  "The  Kuznets  Process  and  the Inequality-Development  Relationship",  Journalf
Development  Economics  40, p.25-52.
Atkinson,  A. (1994):  "Seeking  to Explain  the Distribution  of Income",  Discussion  Paper  WSP 106,  London  School  of
Economics.
Becker,  G. (1975):  Human  Capital.  Cambridge:  NBER.
Blinder,  A. (1975): "Distribution  Effects  and  the Aggregate  Consumption  Function",  Journal  of Political  Economy  87,
p. 608-26.
Bosworth,  B.P. (1993):  Saving  and  Investment  in a Global  Economy.  Brookings:  Washington,  D.C.
Bourguignon,  F. and  C. Mornison  (1990):  "Income  Distribution,  Development,  and  Foreign  Trade:  A Cross  Sectional
Analysis."  European  Economic  Review  34.
Bunting,  D. (1991):  "Savings  and  the Distribution  of Income."  Journal  of Post  Kevnesian  Economics  14,  3-22.
Carroll,  C. and  D. Weil  (1994):  "Saving  and Growth:  A Reinterpretation."  Carnegie-Rochester  Conference  Series  on
Public  Policy  40, p.133-192.
Carroll,  C. andL. Summers  (1991):  "Consumption  Growth  Parallels  Income  Growth:  Some  New  Evidence."  inB. D.
Berrheim  and  J. B. Shoven  (eds.):  National  Saving  and  Economic  Performance.  Chicago:  University  of
Chicago  Press,  305-43.
Carroll,  C., J. Overland,  and  D. Weil  (1994):  "Saving  and  Growth  with  Habit  Formation."  manuscript.
Clarke,  G. (1992):  "More  Evidence  on Income  Distribution  and  Growth."  The World  Bank.  Policy  Research  Working
PRa  1064.
Collins,  S. (1991):  "Saving  Behavior  in Ten  Developing  Countries."  in  B. D. Bernheim  and  J. B. Shoven  (eds.):
National  Saving  and  Economic  Performance.  Chicago:  University  of Chicago  Press, 349-72.
Cook,  C. (1995):  "Savings  Rates  and Income  Distribution:  Further  Evidence  from LDCs",  Applied  Economics  27, p.
71-82.
Cowell,  F. (1977):  Measuring  Inequalitv:  Techniques  for the Social  Sciences.  New York:  John  Wiley  and Sons.
Deaton,  A. (1991):  "Saving  and  Liquidity  Constraints."  Econometrica  59, 1121-42.24
Deaton,  A. (1992):  Understanding  Consumption.  Oxford:  Clarendon  Press.
Deaton,  A. (1995):  "Growth  and  Saving:  What  do we  know,  what  do we need  to know,  and  what  might  we learn?"
manusgript.  Princeton  University,  Research  Program  in Development  Studies.
Deininger,  K. and  L. Squire  (1995):  "Measuring  Income  Inequality:  a New  Data  Base",  unpublished  manuscrit. The
World  Bank.
Della  Valle,  P. and N. Oguchi  (1976):  "Distribution,  the Aggregate  Consumption  Function,  and  the Level  of Economic
Development:  Some  Cross-Country  Results",  Journal  of Political  Economy  84,1325-34.
Dornbusch,  R. and S. Edwards  (1991):  "The  Macroeconomics  of Populism."  in  R. Dornbusch  and S. Edwards  (eds.):
The  Macroeconomics  of Populism  in Latin  America.  Chicago:  University  of Chicago  Press.
Edwards,  S. (1995):  "Why  Are Saving  Rates so Different  Across  Countries?:  An International  Comparative  Analysis."
NBER  Working  Paper  5097.
Feldstein,  M. and C. Horioka  (1980):  "Domestic  Saving  and  International  Capital  Flows."  Economic  Journal  90, 314-
29.
Feldstein,  M. and  P. Bacchetta  (1991):  "National  Saving  and  International  Investment."  in B. D. Bemheim  and J.
Shoven  (eds.):  National  Saving  and  Economic  Performnance.  Chicago:  University  of Chicago  Press.
Flavin,  M.  (1  98  1): "The  Adjustment  of Consumption  to Changing  Expectations  about  Future  Income.  " Journal  of
Political  Economy  89,  974-1009.
Friedman,  M. (I 957):  A Theory  of the Consumption  Function.  Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press.
Galor,  0. and  J. Zeira  (1993):  "Income  Distribution  and  Macroeconomics."  Review  of Economic  Studies  60, 35-52.
Gersovitz,  M. (1988):  "Saving  and  Development."  in  H. Chenery  and T.N. Srinivasan  (eds.):  Handbook  of Development
Economics.  Amsterdam:  North  Holland,  381-424.
Gupta,  K.  (1970):  "Personal  Saving  in Developing  Nations:  Further  Evidence",  Economic  Record  46, 0. 243-249.
Hall,  R. (1978):  "Stochastic  Implications  of the Life-Cycle  Permanent  Income  Hypothesis:  Theory  and  Evidence."
Joumal  of Political  Economv  86, 75-96.
Hayashi,  F. (1985):  "Tests  for Liquidity  Constraints:  A Critical  Survey."  NBER Working  Paper 1720.
Hong,  K.  (1995):  "Income  Distribution  and  Aggregate  Saving",  manuscript.  Harvard  University,  Cambridge,  Mass.,
November.
Houthakker,  H. (1961):  "An  Intemational  Comparison  of Personal  Saving",  Bulletin  of the Intemational  Statistical
Institute  38,  p. 55-69.
Jappelli,  T. and  M. Pagano  (1994):  "Saving,  Growth,  and  Liquidity  Constraints."  Ouarterly  Journal  of Economics  109,
83-109.
Kaldor,  N. (1957):  "A Model  of Economic  Growth."  Economic  Jouma 57.25
Kelley,  A.C.  and J.G.  Williamson  (1968):  "Household  Savings  Behavior  in Develop9ing  Countries:  the Indonesian
Case",  Economic  Development  and  Cultural  Change.  16 (3): 385-403.
Kirman,  A.  (1992):  "Whom  or What  Does  the Representative  Individual  Represent?"  Jouna  of Economic  Perspeii
2, 117-36.
Kotlikoff,  L. and  L. Sunmners  (1981):  "The  Role  of Intergenerational  Transfers  in Aggregate  Capital  Accumulation."
Journal  of Political  Economy  90,706-32.
Kotikoff,  L.  and  L. Summers  (1988):  "The  Contribution  of Intergenerational  Transfers  to Total  Wealth:  A Reply."  in  D.
Kessler  and  A. Masson  (eds.):  Modelling  the Accumulation  and  Distribution  of Wealth  Oxford:  Clarendon
Press.
Kuznets,  S. (1955):  "Economic  Growth  and  Income  Inequality."  American  Economic  Review  89,1-28.
Leff,  N.H.  (1969):  "Dependency  Rates and  Savings  Rates."  American  Economnic  Review  59, 886-96.
Levine,  R. and  D. Renelt  (1992):  "A Sensitivity  Analysis  of Cross-Country  Growth  Regressions."  Amanca Econic
Revi  82, 942-63.
Lewis,  W.A.  (1954):  "Economic  Development  with  Unlimited  Supplies  of Labor."  The  Manchester  School  22, 139-91.
Lim,  D. (1980):  "Income  Distribution,  Export  Instability  and  Savings  Behavior",  Economic  Devdopment  and  Cultal
Change  26, 359-64.
Maddala,  G.  (1983):  Limited-dependent  and  Qualitative  Variables  in Econometrics.  Canbridge  University  Press.
Maddison,  A. (1992):  "A Long-Run  Perspective  on Saving."  Scandinavian  Journal  of  Economics  94, 181-96.
Mankiw,  N.,  D. Romer,  and  D. Weil  (1992):  "A Contribution  to the Empirics  of Economic  Growth",  Q°uartb Joumal
of Economics  107,407-38.
Marglin,  S. (1984):  Growth.  Distribution,  and  Prices.  Cambridge,  M.A.:  Harvard  University  Press.
Masson,  P.,  T. Bayoumi  and  H. Samiel  (1995):  "Saving  Behavior  in Industrial  and  Developing  Countries."  m
International  Monetary  Fund.
Menchik,  P. and  M.  David  (1983):  "Income  Distribution,  Lifetime  Savings,  and  Bequests",  American  Economic  Review
73,  p.672-690.
Modigliani,  F. (1970):  "The  Life  Cycle  Hypothesis  of Savings  and  Intercountry  Differences  in the Savings  Ratio",  in
W.A.  Eltis,  M.F.G.  Scott  and J.N.  Wolfe  (eds.):  Induction.  Growth  and Trade. Oxford  University  Press.
Modigliani,  F. and  R. Brunberg  (1954):  "Utility  Analysis  and  the Consumption  Function:  an Interpretation  of Cross-
Section  Data."  in  K.K.  Kurihara  (ed.):  Post-Keynesian  Economics.  New  Brmswick,  N.J.:  Rutgers  University
Press.
Modigliani,  F. and  R. Brumberg  (1979):  "Utility  Analysis  and  the Consumption  Function:  an Attempt  at Integration".  in
A.  Abel (ed.):  The Collected  Papers  of Franco  Modigiani.  Vol.  2, Cambridge,  M.A.:  MIT  Press.
Musgrove,  P. (1980):  "Incomne  Distribution  and  the Aggregate  Consumption  Function."  Joumal  of Political  Eggw=
88,  504-25.26
Ogaki,  M., J. Ostry  and  C.M.  Reinhart  (1994):  "Saving  Behavior  in Low-  and  Middle-Income  Developing  Counties:  A
Comparison."  manuscript  International  Monetary  Fund.
Pasinetti,  L.  (1962):  "Rate  of Profit  and Income  Distribution  in Relation  to the  Rate  of Economnic  GrowthL"  Reviewf
Economic  Studies  29, 267-79.
Perotti,  R. (1995):  "Growth,  Income  Distribution,  and  Democracy:  What  the Data Say",
Columbia  University,  New  York, September.
Persson,  T.  and G.  Tabellini  (1994):  "Is Inequality  Harmful  for Growth?  Theory  and  Evidence."
Review  84, 600-21.
Pischke,  J-S. (1995):  "Individual  Income,  Incomplete  Information,  and  Aggregate  Consumption",  63 (4),
805-40.
Sahota,  G. (1993):  "Saving  and  Distribution."  in J.H Gapinski  (ed.):  TeEconicsofSavin  Boston: luwer
Academic  Publishers,  193-231.
Schmidt-Hebbel,  K., L. Serven,  and  A. Solimano  (1996):  "Saving  and  Investment:  Paradigms,  Puzzles,  Policies",  Wrid
Bank  Research  Observer  (forthcoming).
Schmidt-Hebbel,  K., S. Webb,  and G. Corsetti  (1992):  "Household  Saving  in Developing  Countries:  First  Cross-
Country  Evidence."  World  Bank  Economic  Review  6,529-47.
Solimano,  A. (1995).  "The  End  of the Hard  Choices?  Revisiting  the Relationship  between  Income  Distribution  and
Growth."  manuscript  Inter-American  Development  Bank.
Solow,  R. (1956):  "A Contribution  to the Theory  of Economic  Growth"  Quar],  Journal  of Economics  70,65-94.
Venieris,  Y., and  D. Gupta  (1986):  "Income  Distribution  and  Sociopolitical  Instability  as Determinats  of Savings:  a
Cross-Sectional  Model",  Journal  of Political  Economy  94,  p.873-883.
Williamson,  J. (1968):  "Personal  Saving  in  Developing  Nations:  an Intertemporal  Cross-Section  fron Asia",  Eggini
Record  44, p. 194-202.
Zou,  Heng-Fu  (1993):  "The Spirit  of Capitalism  and  Long-Run  Growth",  manuscript,  forthcoming  in EI.gJonul
of Political  Economy.Table I
Income Distribution Indicators:
Descriptive Statistics
Number of  Income Share Redo
Observatons  Gini Coefficient  of Top 20% to Bottom 40%  Income Share of Middle  60%Y
Mean  Std. dev.  Mean  Std. dev.  Mean  Std. dev.
World  52  39.62  2.70  2.72  0.04  0.48  0.02
OECD Countries  20  33.34  1.92  2.08  0.04  0.54  0.01
Developing Countries  32  43.68  3.17  3.65  0.03  0.45  0.05
of which:
Take-Off Countries  10  40.31  2.87  2.63  0.04  0.47  0.02
Other Developing  22  45.21  3.31  4.00  0.05  0.43  0.03
Table 2
Correlation Matrix of Basic Regressors
GNS/GNP  Per Capita  Growth rate of  Gini  Income share  Income share  Old age
GNP  Per Capita GNP coefficient  of top2O/bot4O  of middle 60  dependency ratio
GNS/GNP
Per Capita GNP  0.311
Growth rate of Per Capita GNP  0.632  -0.001
Gini coefficient  -0.278  -0.551  -0.238
Income share of top 20%/bottom 40%  -0.277  -0.469  -0.233  0.951
Income share of middle 60%  0.335  0.652  0.204  -0.957  -0.919
Old age dependency ratio  0.177  0.860  -0.012  -0.627  -0.536  0.705
Young age dependency ratio  -0.394  -0.872  -0.211  0.683  0.603  -0.763  -0.933Table 3
Cross-Section  Estimates  of Saving  Equations
Dependent  Variable:  GNS/GNP
(t-statistics  in parentheses)
Equation
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
Sample  Full  Full  OECD  LDC  Full  OECD  LDC  Full W/o  Take-  LDC  w/o Take-
Off Countries  Off Countries
Constant  36.506  36.055  28.209  39.844  37.632  30.999  41.447  32.57  52.299
(2.762)  (2.666)  (1.261)  (2.149)  (2.708)  (1.348)  (2.144)  (2.155)  (2.616)
Real  GNP  per capita  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.004  0.001  0.001  0.004  0.002  0.011
(1987  constant  dollar)  (1.736)  (1.667)  (1.906)  (1.151)  (1.375)  (1.196)  (1.054)  (2.165)  (2.070)
Real  GNP  per  capita  -5.67E-08  -5.5E-08 -7.22E-08  -3.26E-07  -4.20E-08  -4.61E-08  -4.13E-07  -7.96E-08  -1.84E-06
squared  (-1.429)  (-1.376)  (-1.603)  (-0.727)  (-0.979)  (-0.823)  (-0.730)  (-1.903)  (-1.475)
Real  GNP  growth  rate  1.479  1.495  3.265  1.074  1.502  3.202  1.107  0.923  0.341  c
(3.055)  (3.042)  (2.757)  (1.779)  (2.843)  (2.687)  (1.738)  (1.308)  (0.729)
Old age  dependency  ratio  -1.258  -1.253  -0.927  -1.36  -1.271  -0.878  -1.671  -1.188  -2.742
(-2.643)  (-2.618)  (-1.490)  (-1.061)  (-2.522)  (-1.452)  (-1.106)  (-2.055)  (-1.819)
Young  age  dependency  -0.413  -0.439  -0.647  -0.402  -0.425  -0.593  -0.455  -0.426  -0.518
ratio  (-1.620)  (1.672)  (-1.218)  (-1.143)  (-1.521)  (-1.219)  (-1.202)  (-1.503)  (-1.631)
Gini  coefficient  0.035  0.105  -0.095  0.094  -0.238
(0.381)  (0.982)  (-0.734)  (1.054)  (-1.613)
Income  share  ratio  of  -0.019  0.222  -0.649
top  20%/bottom  40%  (4.033)  (0.165)  (-0.921)
Adjusted  R 2 0.528  0.520  0.539  0.511  0.506  0.525  0.497  0.455  0.413
Standard  Error  3.875  3.912  2.691  4.446  4.092  2.817  4.742  3.681  3.458
Number  of Observations  52  52  20  32  45  18  27  42  22
Note:  The above  t-statistics  were computed  using  heteroskedasticity-corrected  standard  errors.29
Table  4
Cross-Section  Estimates  of Saving  Equations
Dependent  Variable:  GNSIGNP
(t-statistics  in parentheses)
Equation
1  2  3  4  5  6
Sample  Full  Full  Full  Full  Full  Full
Constant  38.740  23.249  41.816  33.354  35.140  27.395
(2.654)  (1.480)  (2.709)  (2.425)  (2.061)  (1.170)
Real  GNP  per  capita  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.001
(1987  constant  dollar)  (0.517)  (1.614)  (1.211)  (2.032)  (1.402)  (1.251)
Real  GNP  per capita  squared  -5.33E-08  -5.63E-08  -3.76E-08  -6.99E-08  -4.22E-08  -3.84E-08
(-1.334)  (-1.377)  (-0.933)  (-1.734)  (-0.995)  (1.251)
Real  GNP  growth  rate  1.420  1.453  1.291  1.234  1.497  1.504
(2.710)  (2.912)  (2.429)  (2.065)  (2.817)  (2.765)
Old  age  dependency  ratio  -1.241  -1.256  -1.349  -0.997  -1.273  -1.287
(-2.556)  (-2.591)  (-2.638)  (-2.002)  (-2.498)  (-2.471)
Young  age  dependency  ratio  -0.444  -0.484  -0.455  -0.485  -0.407  -0.411
(-1.656)  (-1.794)  (-1.655)  (-1.736)  (-1.445)  (-1.439)
Gini coefficient  -0.024  0.763  -0.032  0.022
(-0.180)  (1.541)  (-0.347)  (0.191)
Income  share  ratio of top 20% I bottom  40%  0.548
(0.526)
Income  share  of middle  60%  0.038  0.173
(0.218)  (0.526)
GNP  variability  -16.185
(-1.317)
Multiplication  of GNP  and Gini coefficient  2.15E-05
(1.099)
Gini coefficient  squared  -0.009
(-1.410)
Latin  America  regional  dummy  4.413
(1.129)
Africa  regional  dummy  3.975
(1.001)
Asia regional  dummy  5.164
(1.403)
Adjusted  R 2 0.516  0.520  0.535  0.508  0.507  0.496
Standard  Error  3.925  3.911  3.848  3.960  4.089  4.134
Number  of Observations  52  52  52  52  45  45
Note:  The  above  t-statistics  were  computed  using heteroskedasticity-corrected  standard  errors.Table 6
Cross-Section  Estimates  of Saving  Equations
Dependent  Variable:  GDS/GDP
(t-statistics  in parentheses)
Equation
1  2  3  4  5  a
Sample  Full  LDC  Full  Full  Full  Full
Constant  39.011  51.769  28.699  40.523  34.594  41.524
(2.444)  (2.158)  (1.857)  (2.305)  (2.116)  (2.558)
Real  GDP  per capita  0.002  0.005  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.002
(1987  constant  dollar)  (2.260)  (1.615)  (2.792)  (1.199)  (2.897)  (1.965)
Real  GDP  per  capita squared  -7.94E-08  -5.58E-07  -8.44E-08  -7.81  E-08  -1.03E-07  -6.49E-08
(-1.822)  (-1.198)  (-2.008)  (-1.777)  (-2.304)  (-1.353)
Real  GDP growth  rate  0.430  -0.213  0.582  0.385  0.130  0.447
(0.664)  (-0.251)  (1.003)  (0.558)  (0.163)  (0.688)
Old age dependency  ratio  -1.695  -1.791  -1.574  -1.688  -1.196  -1.695
(-3.256)  (-1.121)  (-3.121)  (-3.219)  (-2.144)  (-3.026)
Young  age  dependency  ratio  -0.548  -0.716  -0.359  -0.552  -0.644  -0.480
(-1.812)  (-1.589)  (-1.210)  (-1.780)  (-2.000)  (-1.443)  o
Gini coefficient  0.149  0.012  0.134  0.117  0.097
(1.368)  (0.087)  (1.219)  (0.7340)  (0.673)
Income  share  ratio  of top 20%  / bottom  40%  0.546
(0.726)
GDP  variability  14.945
(1.760)
Multiplication  of GDP and  Gini coefficient  1.16E-05
(0.483)
Latin  America  regional  dummy  9.324
(2.337)
Africa  regional  dummy  8.848
(1.952)
Asia regional  dummy  9.176
(2.540)
Adjusted  R2  0.355  0.323  0.385  0.342  0.373  0.290
Standard  Error  4.770  5.447  4.656  4.816  4.704  5.013
Number  of Observations  52  32  52  52  52  45
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LONG-TERM  WORLD  SAVING AND INCOME  LEVEL
(Gross National Saving Rate Including Net Current Transfers and Real GNP Per Capita, 1965  - 94 Averages, by
Countries)
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